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The purpose of this thesis was to determine whether a right to privacy exists within the 
body of the Constitution. Knowing that such a right is not textually explicit, I chose to examine 
arguments concerning both the intent of the founding fathers and the idea that a right to privacy 
exists as a human right. I also examined an extensive body of case law to determine how the 
Supreme Court has defended such a right as implicit in the Constitution. Based upon my findings 
in the literature and constitutional law, I determined that a right to privacy is protected by 
constitutional text. 
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"Civilization is the progress toward a society of privacy. The savage's whole existence is public, 
ruled by the laws of his tribe. Civilization is the process of setting man free from men. " 
- AynRand 
The codification of law is and always has been the most difficult task in fonning a new 
government. Laying down a series of laws that are designed to govern the people while 
simultaneously allowing them independence through rights and liberties, is a challenge that 
cannot go without its struggles and its controversies. The fonnation of the United States 
Constitution was no different. 
The document has met with serious debate over its meaning since its ratification in 1789. 
Ambiguities in the text have led to fierce courtroom battles over what exactly our rights and 
liberties inherent in the Bill of Rights and the seventeen subsequent amendments entail. One of 
the most recent, notwithstanding most popular, constitutional quarrels, has been over the right to 
pnvacy. 
There is no line of text in the Constitution that guarantees the people a right to privacy, but 
there a number of vague - yet striking - allusions to a right to privacy within the body of the 
document. As arbiter of the law, the Supreme Court has had to mediate these battles and 
detennine what, if anything, in the Constitution points to a potential right to privacy. Arguments 
on either side have rested on the intent of the Framers, the lack of explicit text, the appropriate 
level of interpretation necessary for interpreting the Constitution, and the various references to 
something hidden in the language of the law. 
Without solid textual grounding, it is difficult to imagine articulating any solid evidence that 
such a constitutional right exists. Through an examination ofthe Court, the history of privacy as 
a concept, and the history of privacy as law, however, I will provide evidence to show that there 
is such a right to privacy implicitly explicit within the body of the Constitution. 
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BACKGROUND 
"It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. " 
- Chief Justice John Marshall 
It is essential that one have a basic understanding of the history and function of the 
Supreme Court before delving further into the issue of privacy as a constitutionally protected 
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right. I will later return to these issues and terms without pausing for detailed explanation, so it is 
pertinent that one become acquainted - if only briefly - with the complex inner and outer 
workings of the Court before attempting to process the more complicated information that I will 
present in coming sections. 
THE HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 
The inception. The Supreme Court became a staple of the American legal system with the 
ratification of the United States Constitution and the passage of the Federal judiciary Act of 
1789.2 Article III of the United States Constitution made the provision for a federal judiciary 
with a single superior court. It was this act of Congress, however, that gave the United States 
Supreme Court its prominence in the judicial system.3 Article III also laid out the initial powers 
of the Court, which, in truth, were extremely limited. The powers of the Supreme Court, under 
the Constitution, were limited to hearing cases upon original, mandatory, and appellate 
jurisdiction as defined and recommended by the United States Congress.4 Congress was given 
the power to define which types of cases, and even how many cases, the Court would hear. 5 The 
Court's original jurisdiction involves "all cases, in law and equity, arising under this [sic] 
2 Federal Judiciary Act of 1789. 
3 Ibid and United States Constitution, Article III. 
4 United States Constitution, Article III. 
5 Ibid, Article II. 
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Constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties.,,6 More generally, the original 
jurisdiction involves all federal cases, including those affecting ambassadors, other public 
ministers, and consuls involved in disputes to which the United States is a party; suits between 
two different states; suits between a state and a citizen of another state; and suits between a state 
and/or its citizens and foreign countries.7 The Court's mandatory jurisdiction includes cases 
which it is required to hear because of the structure of the United States court system. Certain 
cases, depending upon which path they take through the system, must be appealed directly to the 
Supreme Court, and the Court may not refuse to hear these cases.8 As far as appellate jurisdiction 
goes, Congress has Article III powers to decide which types of cases the Court may hear on 
appeal, but the primary power of selection lies with the justices of the Court.9 They receive, on 
average, seven thousand petitions per annum. 10 Ninety-five percent of the cases that come before 
the Court as petition come on appeal from lower courts. I I Almost all petitions come as requests 
for certiorari, whether they are formal legal requests on appeal from lower courts or hand-written 
pleas from individuals. When the Supreme Court grants "cert," as the justices call it, they simply 
agree to hear a case; conversely, when the Court does not grant cert, it does not qualify as a 
ruling or an affirmation of the lower court's decision - only a declaration that the Supreme Court 
does not agree to hear the case. 12 On average, of the nearly seven thousand cases petitioned, the 
Court only agrees to hear oral arguments in about one hundred per year. 13 
6 David M. O'Brien, Storm Center: The Supreme Court in American Politics, 7th ed., (New York: W.W. Norton and 
Co., 2005), p. 164. 
7 Ibid, p. 164-165. 
8 Ibid, p. 165. 
9 Ibid, p. 165. 
10 Steve Mount, "The U.S. Constitution Online," 6 October 2005, <http://usconstitution.net> (Accessed 18 October 
2005). 
11 O'Brien, p. 158. 
12 Ibid, p. 165 
\3 Mount 
5 
The membership. When the Supreme Court was finally unveiled on February 2, 1790, the 
number of justices was set at six under the provisions of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789.14 
Congress was given the constitutional power to change the number of justices on the Court as it 
saw necessary,15 and the final number was set at nine in 1869, with one chief justice and eight 
associate justices. 16 Justices of the Supreme Court must be nominated by the president upon the 
vacancy of a seat on the bench or upon the addition of a justice to the Court by an act of 
Congress. After formal nomination, the candidate for the justiceship must undergo a 
confirmation hearing before the United States Senate, and then must be confirmed by a majority 
vote in the Senate. 17 Article III of the Constitution awards all federal judges life tenure under 
"good behavior." Typically, justices may vacate their positions by death, voluntary retirement, or 
impeachment. 18 It is usually understood that justices are granted life tenure to ensure that they do 
not have to appeal to politics to maintain their positions and status. The judicial branch is 
supposed to be the arbiter oflaw, not simply of political questions, and so it is widely held that 
federal judges should not be subject to election or periodic votes of confidence. In keeping them 
out of the immediate political eye, justices are supposed to be free from political influence and 
the pressure to conform to either the will of those who put them in power or public opinion. 
Though the design is ideal, and objectivity is a noble pursuit, the original intentions do not 
always hold sway. During the inception of the Constitution, the public had little say in 
government. The elites - in special caucuses - elected the president and senators; only the House 
of Representatives was freely elected by the people en masse. 19 Thus, the higher-ups in 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Lawrence Baum, The Supreme Court, 7th ed., (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2001), p. 14. 
17 Ibid, p. 14. 
18 Ibid, p. 14. 
19 Richard Davis, Electing Justice: Fixing the Supreme Court Nomination Process, (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2005), p. 86. 
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government, including the justices, were not subject to critique by democratic process. Over the 
next two hundred years, however, there was a shift toward greater democratic participation. The 
advent of universal manhood suffrage,20 woman suffrage,21 the direct election of senators,22 and 
the media's interest in politics put all members ofthe federal government in the spotlight. This is 
especially seen when cases of extreme controversy, such as those dealing with abortion or gay 
rights, are placed on the Court's docket. Cable news stations like CNN and MSNBC announce 
the impending cases and air the arguments on both sides before the justices have a chance to hear 
oral arguments in court. The major cases tried in the Supreme Court now are also first tried in the 
court of public opinion, and though there is no requirement that the justices conform to the will 
of the public, only rarely do they hand down rulings that seem to oppose the general public 
consensus. Their job necessarily involves paying attention to what the public wants, and in order 
"to persist and function effectively ... [the Court] must continuously try to amass and husband 
the good will of the public.,,23 In the event that a Supreme Court decision is not met with support 
by the public, the law makes provisions for override. Congress may issue remedial legislation to 
change the law in question or it may issue statutory override, which then becomes the law until 
the statutory change is challenged in case before the Supreme Court. The responsibility of 
enforcement lies with the executive branch, and the executives are by no means required to 
enforce these decisions.24 If President Dwight D. Eisenhower had not demanded the National 
Guard to enforce public school integration following the 1954 decision in Brown v. Board of 
20 United States Constitution, Amendment XV 
21 Ibid, Amendment XIX 
22 Ibid, Amendment XVII 
23 Jeff Yates, Popular Justice: Presidential Prestige and Executive Success in the Supreme Court, (Albany: State 
University of New York, 2002), p. 16. 
24 Yates, p. 17 
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Education of Topeka, for example, it is possible that widespread integration would never have 
occurred. 
The most effective - and consequently the most difficult to execute - method for 
overriding a Supreme Court decision is through constitutional amendment. Only six decisions 
have ever been overruled by constitutional amendment, the most prominent being the Civil War 
Amendments' override of the Dred Scott decision of 1857?5 The Dred Scott decision declared 
that slaves were not citizens, and could therefore be treated simply as property. The Thirteenth, 
Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments make up the Civil War Amendments, granting slaves 
freedom, citizenship, and suffrage, respectively. 26 
The revolution. Until the turn of the nineteenth century, the judicial branch was, as 
Founding Father Alexander Hamilton very accurately put it, "the least dangerous branch" of the 
federal government. 27 The Court had no real checks on the other two branches, and 
consequently, it had no real power to stand on when faced with pressure from the legislature or 
the executive. The president had the power to nominate justices and refuse to enforce their 
decrees. The House of Representatives had the power to draw Articles ofImpeachment against 
justices. The Senate held the power to confirm or deny justices a seat on highest bench, and also 
to try them during impeachment hearings. The Court, on the other hand, could do very little to 
affect policy or to check the other branches. It could only hear cases brought to it, and could not 
overturn laws. The interpretation of the law at the tum of the century rested on the prospect that 
all legislation passed was perfectly conformable to the Constitution. Thus, the balance of power 
among the triumvirate was, in a word, unbalanced. 
25 O'Brien, p. 350. 
26 Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857). 
27 O'Brien, p. 30. 
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In 1803, however, the "least dangerous branch" let its ultimate power be known. In 
Marbury v. Madison, the Court decided that Congress had overstepped its Article III powers to 
determine the original jurisdiction of the Supreme COurt,28 and declared the act of Congress 
invalid on its face, and thus - using the term for the first time - unconstitutiona1.29 In his opinion 
for the Court, Chief Justice John Marshall declared that "it is emphatically the province and duty 
of the judicial department to say what the law is," and that the Court was vested with the power 
of judicial review - the ability to interpret the law with respect to the Constitution, and overturn 
any law, statute, policy, or act of Congress that it felt was not in accordance with the laws of the 
document. 30 In what is called the judiciary's first activist decision, the Court handed itself its 
greatest power - a power that has not met with legitimate challenge since its inception. Few can 
dissent in allowing the arbiter of the law the ability to ensure that the laws passed by Congress 
adhere to the "supreme law of the land.,,31 Not allowing the judiciary this power could, in effect, 
have allowed legislative institutions to pass and maintain unjust laws and policies - such as the 
segregation laws in existence until the landmark ruling in Brown v. Board. 32 
Though the Supreme Court gave itself this incredible power, it was at first lax in using it. 
It was used for the first time in Marbury, but it was not to strike down an act of Congress again 
until the Dred Scott case of 1857 - fifty-four years later.33 Since that implementation of judicial 
review, however, the Court's willingness to overturn laws has increased substantially. As shown 
in Table 1, the Court has overturned one hundred forty-eight laws in whole or in part since 1790: 
28 Ibid, p. 30. 
29 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803). 
30 Ibid, at 177. 
31 Charles Fried, Saying What the Law Is: The Constitution in the Supreme Court, (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press), p. 40. 
32 Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
33 O'Brien, p. 30. 
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Table 1: 
Number of Federal Statutes Held Unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, 
1790-1999 
Period Number Period Number 
1790-1799 0 1900-1909 9 
1800-1809 1 1910-1919 6 
1810-1819 0 1920-1929 15 
1820-1829 0 1930-1939 13 
1830-1839 0 1940-1949 2 
1840-1849 0 1950-1959 5 
1850-1859 1 1960-1969 16 
1860-1869 4 1970-1979 20 
1870-1879 7 1980-1989 16 
1880-1889 4 1990-1999 24 
1890-1899 5 Total 148 
Source: Lawrence Baum, The Supreme Court, 7tr ed., (Washington, D.C.: CO 
Press, 2001). 
Though we can see that the Court has been active in using judicial review in federal cases, it 
has been more likely to do so in cases of state laws and local ordinances. Table 2 shows us that 
the Court has overturned more than twelve hundred of these lower laws since 1790: 
Table 2: 
Number of State Laws and Local Ordinances Held Unconstitutional by the 
Supreme Court, 1790-1999 
Period Number Period Number 
1790-1799 0 1900-1909 40 
1800-1809 1 1910-1919 118 
1810-1819 7 1920-1929 139 
1820-1829 8 1930-1939 93 
1830-1839 3 1940-1949 57 
1840-1849 9 1950-1959 61 
1850-1859 7 1960-1969 149 
1860-1869 23 1970-1979 193 
1870-1879 36 1980-1989 162 
1880-1889 46 1990-1999 61 
1890-1899 36 Total 1,249 
Source: Lawrence Baum, The Supreme Court, 7'" ed., (Washington, D.C.: CO 
Press, 2001). 
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Though the Supreme Court has overturned nearly one hundred fifty federal statutes in whole or 
in part, it does not necessarily imply that Congress has been entirely upset about each. Congress 
is more likely to severely oppose the Court's decisions when it invalidates a statute close to the 
time of its inaction or when it is done at a consistent rate. The striking down of older statutes or 
sporadic invalidation is much less likely to stir up conflict between the legislative and judicial 
branches.34 The Court is much more likely to overturn state laws and city ordinances than it is 
federal statutes for one primary reason: When the Court overturns a lower law, it does not place 
the Court at odds with the other two branches of the federal government.35 
A cult of personality. Ideology has become an important criterion in the selection of 
Supreme Court nominees, and this fact will play an important role in later discussion of political 
beliefs intervening in the successful arbitration and interpretation of the law. The Court's 
primary purpose is and always has been the truthful, honest, and objective interpretation of the 
Constitution and the statutory laws ofthe United States. But personal preference has a way of 
sneaking into this supposedly objective analysis. The ultimate aim - and difficulty - for 
members of the Court is to strike a balance between these personal preferences and the accurate 
interpretation ofthe law as faithful to the Constitution.36 
A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 
34 Baum, p. 196 
35 Ibid, p. 198. 
36 Ibid, p. 157. 
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The constitutional revolution of 1803 lays the foundation for the remainder of this 
analysis in its formation of an activist logic in interpreting the Constitution. The power of 
judicial review and the subsequent policy of judicial activism form the basis for a discussion of 
privacy as a constitutionally protected right. We must look, herein, at how judicial review plays a 
role in a loose interpretation of the Constitution, how a strict interpretation imposes judicial 
restraint, and how these theories differ from one another. 
The non-interpretivist approach. The non-interpretivist approach is often referred to as a 
loose construction of the Constitution. Patrons of this interpretation insist that the Framers wrote 
the Constitution so as to be a living document, applicable to any issues which might arise over 
time. They believe that the Constitution is flexible and ambiguous, and that liberties must be 
taken in interpreting what the Framers' actually intended. In short, the non-interpretivist 
approach "frequently requires going beyond text and historical context to structural arguments 
grounded in the Constitution and to broader principles of constitutional politics.,,37 
Judicial review plays a key role in the non-interpretivist approach. Because of the 
ambiguities in the Constitution, interpreters are allowed to decide which laws conform to their 
interpretation of constitutional law, and strike down the ones that do not meet their requirements. 
The interpretivist approach. The interpretivist approach emphasizes a strict construction 
of the Constitution. Supporters of this theory hold that the Constitution should be taken literally, 
without room for interpretation. They believe that the Framers' intentions were explicit and 
unwavering, and that the document should not actually be interpreted per se, but taken directly -
word for word - as it was adopted in 1789. In a nutshell, the interpretivist approach holds that 
37 O'Brien, p. 302 
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"constitutional interpretation should be confined to the text and historical provisions of the 
Constitution.,,38 
Judicial review is not as much a key component in an interpretivist approach as in the 
non-interpretivist approach. The distinction between judicial review as implemented in loose and 
strict constructions is that in a loose approach, there is much more room for judicial review. 
When interpreting the Constitution broadly, it is easier to strike down legislation as 
unconstitutional because there is more space with which to take liberties. With a strict 
construction, the only room there is for judicial review is by striking down legislation that 
directly conflicts with the explicit text of the Constitution. 
Activism and restraint. It is from these two camps that the notions of judicial activism 
and judicial restraint arise. Judicial activism itself has been interpreted many ways to include 
many different components, but for the purposes of this argument, we must adopt a general, yet 
sufficient definition. Activism is a judicial policy that "makes significant changes in public 
policy, particularly in policies established by other institutions.,,39 This can mean interpreting the 
Constitution very broadly, overturning a long-standing precedent, writing legislation in an 
opinion, or striking down laws, statutes, ordinances, or policies. The core of judicial activism is 
the idea that judges should not avoid cases, and they should exercise their powers to their fullest 
extent.40 
Judicial restraint is simply the tendency to avoid activist policies. This is typically shown 
by an adherence to narrow groundings in the Constitution, a refusal to hear certain issues in 
38 Ibid, p. 302 
39 Baum, p. 5. 
40 Marvin Schick, "Judicial Activism on the Supreme Court," Supreme Court Activism and Restraint, Stephen C. 
Halpern and Charles M. Lamb, eds., (Lexington: D.C. Heath and Co., 1982), p. 45. 
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court, a refusal to exercise judicial review, or a refusal to overturn precedent.41 Judicial review is 
generally thought to follow a few certain assumptions about both the operations and purpose of 
the judicial branch. First, the justices are appointed not to mix in their personal views with the 
law, or to add their own brand of ethics to the nature ofthe Constitution, but to faithfully 
interpret the law according to the intent of the Framers. Secondly, the justices are to defer 
"political question" to the legislative and executive branches. They are not to rule on issues over 
which one of the other branches may exercise control and oversight. Third, the justices are 
intended to rely also on statutory construction and not simply on constitutional construction. In 
this way, they adhere to the intentions of the Framers, the amendments of the people, and the 
laws of the modem land. Fourth, the Supreme Court is only supposed to accept cases where the 
parties bringing suit have standing to sue. Cases may not be brought arbitrarily, and the party in 
question must have a legitimate case in controversy to present its case to the Court. Fifth, the 
justices are not to issue advisory opinions to lower courts. They are to refrain from extending 
their opinions to the interpretation of the law in all ways, including disclosing how they feel 
about certain issues before they hear them in oral arguments. Finally, the Court should seldom 
overrule the policies of the other branches. This should only be done in cases that involve severe 
and blatant violations of constitutional provisions.42 
The exercise of judicial activism, to the restraintists, is both anti-democratic and a blatant 
usurpation of constitutional power.43 It allows the Court - as a group of only nine - to govern the 
state through the power of policymaking. Regardless of laws drafted, debated, and passed by the 
elected members of Congress and signed by the president, the Supreme Court may assume 
41 Ibid, p. 6. 
42 Charles M. Lamb, "Judicial Restraint on the Supreme Court," Supreme Court Activism and Restraint, Stephen C. 
Halpern and Charles M. Lamb, eds., (Lexington: D.C. Heath and Co., 1982), p. 8. 
43 Ibid, p. 9-12. 
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ultimate legislative power by taking an activist stance. It veritably removes the point of freely 
electing leaders when their decisions and their labor may be stricken from the record based upon 
the ideologies of a few "old" judges. "Americans wind up, on various topics, ruled by nine 
persons appointed for life who are more or less immune to the influence of majority 
sentiment. ,,44 
One of the major misconceptions about the activist-restraint issue is that it follows along 
a liberal-conservative divide. Most people associate judicial activism with liberal politics, 
claiming that liberals have the desire to give the government more power; similarly, people 
associate judicial restraint with conservative politics because conservatives like to minimize the 
size and function of the federal government. This traditional division, however, does not hold 
true - there can be both liberal and conservative activists. Put simply, a judicial activist can be a 
person of any ideology who wishes not to see a certain type of precedent overturned, or a certain 
type of right not read into the Constitution. A conservative activist, for example, would seek to 
overturn a Supreme Court precedent with a long standing of upholding a right to gay marriage. 
Likewise, a liberal activist would seek to overturn long-standing laws prohibiting abortion.45 The 
problem is not in the fact that judicial activism exists, but in where to draw the line in its use. We 
can easily see that activists are more inclined to follow a non-interpretivist approach, and 
restraintists adopt the interpretivist doctrine, but we also have to realize that given modem 
circumstances and the nature of modem problems, we cannot adhere to both. We cannot interpret 
solely the text in some cases, and allow ourselves to be more lenient with other passages. To be 
consistent - to be legitimate - we must adopt one, and only one, cohesive approach to 
constitutional interpretation. Once we have concluded that one is decisively better - or at least 
44 Leslie Friedman Goldstein, In Defense of the Text, (Savage, Maryland: Roman and Littlefield Publishers Inc., 
1991), p. 99. 
45 Ibid, p. 158. 
15 
more appropriate than one or any other, then we can look more accurately at the passages of the 
Constitution, and in turn, develop a better understanding of how to apply these principles to our 
laws. 
A case for activism. It is no longer 1789. It is no longer 1791. Times have changed, and 
life has changed. It is difficult to believe that the text penned in the Constitution 229 years ago is 
still applicable today. We should expect, however, the interpretation of our laws to follow the 
exodus of social progress. Much of the defense of interpretivism centers on the argument of 
Framers' intent. Many claim that the Founding Fathers would not want for us to twist and 
mangle the text of the Constitution to suit our needs, but unfortunately, this is a line of argument 
that cannot stand. Our needs do not match their needs, nor will they ever again. In the two 
hundred twenty-nine years since the ratification of the Constitution, we have seen a second war 
for independence, black and woman suffrage, industrial revolution, Civil War, depression, and 
other radical changes. It is unfeasible to believe that our modem value system is even remotely 
close to that of the Founding Fathers. To adopt the belief that we are supposed to faithfully 
adhere to every line and every word of the Constitution as gospel is, as former Justice William J. 
Brennan, Jr., once said, to ''tum a blind eye to social progress.,,46 There is little room to believe 
that the Framers could have foreseen judicial battles over gay rights, abortion, or stem cells, and 
to interpret the laws as applied to these unique circumstances as they would or might have been 
in the late 1700s is to reduce the value of the human condition. In light of progress and forward-
thinking, we must adopt not only a looser interpretation of the Constitution, but also a 
willingness to enforce these interpretations and exercise activism. 
46 Lino A. Graglia, "How the Constitution Disappeared," Interpreting the Constitution, Jack N. Rackove, ed., 
(Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1990), p. 35. 
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Activism is necessary for several reasons. First, an activist approach to constitutional law 
allows for greater protection of important but inexplicit rights, such as a right to privacy. The 
Constitution, on its face, makes no explicit textual reference to a right to privacy, and even 
though the so-called "right" has been part of the American history and tradition since well before 
the Constitution was written, a strict interpretation does not make the allowance for reading a 
right to privacy into the Constitution.47 Secondly, and in the same vein, activism allows us to 
create rights that mayor may not be explicit in the Constitution. According to the provisions of 
the Ninth Amendment, "the enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights shall not be 
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.,,48 Advocates of judicial restraint 
argue that it is not our responsibility to "create" rights out of the constitutional cloth. If this were 
the case, they say, then there would be no point to having a Constitution at all. However,.again, it 
is faulty to assume that the Framers were aware of every possible situation that could arise under 
the dictates of the Constitution. The Ninth Amendment was James Madison's way of asserting 
that the Framers actually acknowledged that they may not have thought of everything.49 Third, 
judicial activism only helps to strengthen the Court's position as the arbiter of law. The judicial 
branch of the government is vested with the interpretation of the law, but if we do not allow 
judges and justices to interpret, then they are being denied the ability to faithfully and fully 
perform their duties. Ifwe are strictly to adhere to literal text references written more than two 
centuries ago, then the arbitration ofthe law is null. Judicial restraint thus relies on good faith 
that there will never be exceptions to the rules, that there will never arise a case which mayor 
47 Louis D. Brandeis and Samuel D. Warren, "The Right to Privacy," Harvard Law Review, Vol. IV, No.5, (15 
December 1890), <http://www.1awrence.edulfastiboardmawlPrivacLbrand_warr2.htm1> (Accessed 6 October 
2005). 
48 United States Constitution, Amendment IX 
49 Jeffrey M. Shaman, "Interpreting the Constitution: The Supreme Court's Proper and Historic Function," Judicial 
Politics: Readings from 'Judicature,' 3rd ed., Elliot E. Slotnik, ed., (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2005), p. 43. 
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may not make the words of the Constitution seem vague or overbroad. This, as we have seen 
throughout the past two centuries, however, is blatantly false, and the Constitution is rife with 
ambiguities in the first place. Article II declares that the president is required to maintain the 
"faithful execution" of the law. 50 Article III declares that federal judges will retain their positions 
as long as they exhibit "good behavior," but ifnot, may be tried for "high crimes and 
misdemeanors.,,51 The Fourth Amendment refers to "unreasonable" searches and seizures. 52 The 
Eighth Amendment prohibits "cruel and unusual" punishment.53 The Fourteenth Amendment 
guarantees certain "privileges and immunities.,,54 Nowhere in the entire document are these 
terms clarified, though. We are left with a vague body of laws meant to serve as the "supreme 
law of the land," and this gives the judicial department no choice but to interpret. In fact, 
textualism at its finest points us in the direction of extratextualism.55 Even if we take every word 
at its face value, these ambiguities force the courts to resort to interpretation. What are literally 
"unreasonable" searches and seizures? What qualifies as "cruel and unusual"? Were we able to 
ask James Madison to answer these questions, perhaps we would have a resolved debate. For 
now, however, we must trust to ourselves, and to our current values, to determine to what these 
ambiguities refer. 
More than an appeal to ambiguities, however, gives us reason to adopt this approach to 
extratextualism and activism. We must recognize that the federal government is already a limited 
one, and that there are checks and balances to ensure that judges do not - as textualists fear - run 
rampant with the fundamental values of the Constitution. 56 In truth, and to take a radical 
50 United States Constitution, Article II. 
51 Ibid, Article III. 
52 Ibid, Amendment IV. 
53 Ibid, Amendment VIII. 
54 Ibid, Amendment XIV. 
55 Goldstein, p. 103. 
56 Philip Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate: Theory of the Constitution, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), p. 7-12. 
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standpoint, these bedrock principles of the Constitution would exist in our culture with or 
without the text to give them meaning. Liberty, equality, community, and solidarity - all 
principles upon which America was founded - do not rely on a 229-year-old document for their 
survival, meaning, or importance to our culture. We could veritably do away with the 
Constitution, and our intuitions about rights and justice and basic values would continue to 
thrive.57 James Madison and Thomas Jefferson even asserted that it was not the Constitution that 
should be the torch for America, but the Declaration of Independence, wherein our forefathers 
laid out the values for which the country stood. 58 Do away with the Constitution, they said, and 
the people may revolt, but the people will not dissolve. 
Judges should be the ones to elucidate these bedrock principles where Congress fails to 
do so, as well. When the executive and the legislative branches fall short of upholding the rights 
and liberties of the people, then it becomes the responsibility of the judiciary - as arbiters of the 
law - to ensure that these bedrock values are not compromised. 59 Even if this means taking a step 
outside of basic Article III powers, the justices are endowed with the obligation to uphold the 
basic principles of the Constitution - this is what we mean when we say that they are supposed to 
interpret the document. They are not vested with the power to make it say whatever they would 
have it say, but rather, they are entrusted with interpreting the contract so as to maximally 
promote these founding principles, and restrict the rights and liberties of the people only when 
absolutely necessary. 
A final defense, and the one that is most advantageous to the argument at hand, is that 
some parts of the human personality are simply not suited for the governmental sphere.6o First 
57 Graglia, p. 47. 
58 Harry V. Jaffa, "What Were the Original Intentions of the Framers of the Constitution of the United States?" Original Intent 
and the Framers of the Constitution, Harry V. Jaffa, ed., (Washington, D.C.: Regnery Publishers, 1994), p. 43. 
59 Bobbitt, p. 7-12. 
60 Ibid, p. 7-12. 
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and foremost among these characteristics is privacy, the area where the crux of the 
activistlrestraintist debate derives. Under this defense, it is recognized that there are just some 
things that the government - state, federal, or municipal- has no business interfering with. What 
is done in the privacy of one's home, for example, should be none of the government's concern, 
with the exception of illegal activity. Some argue that homosexual conduct and illicit drugs are 
illegal, regardless of where the acts are performed. We, like the justices, have to recognize the 
difference between illegal acts that are justifiably prohibited and those acts that are made illicit 
simply out of legislative taste. Those that are not justifiably prohibited should not be regulated by 
the government within the private sphere. This is an argument of much controversy, and one we 
will return to more fully in the next section when we discuss personal privacy. 
The vox popuiaire. It goes without saying that interpretations will run parallel to the 
social doctrines of the period in which they are interpreted. It is fairly certain that the ruling in 
Roe v. Wade would not have stood in the middle of the nineteenth century, but the 1970s was a 
period more amenable to women's rights and issues of personal privacy.61 Though the justices 
may have had qualms with interpreting an implicit right to privacy as inclusive of a right to an 
abortion, and though the outcry has not died down in the more than thirty years since the 
decision, its acceptability is based on the acceptability of prevailing social doctrine. What we 
should not do, once we have accepted that the Constitution should be interpreted with respect to 
nuance, is ignore the voice of the people. Mob democracy is a dangerous thing, without doubt, 
but we cannot pretend to be a democratic republic if we do not at least pay attention to the whim 
of the public. Not all public preferences will be reconcilable with the principles of the 
Constitution - slavery and the oppression of women certainly were not - but this is the reason 
that we have the judicial branch in the first place. The people call for action, the legislators form 
61 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
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their desires into law, the executive chooses to endorse the public's will, and the judiciary then 
tells us whether what we want is what we may justly have. We cannot ignore social progress and 
we cannot stifle the vox populaire. This is not to say we must try to please all of the people all of 
the time, but we must aim toward the just end - to ensure liberty, equality, community, and 
solidarity - regardless of a line of text to back us up. 
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THE DOCTRINE OF PRIVACY 
"It could not but happen, and was foreseen at the birth of the Constitution, that difficulties and 
differences of opinion might occasionally arise in expounding terms and phrases necessarily 
used in such a charter. " 
- James Madison 
What James Madison could not have foreseen with the utterance of these words, 
however, was how appropriate they would become some two hundred years later. The text of the 
Constitution, though vague and ambiguous, is definite, and it points to a host of specific rights 
and liberties granted to the people. With any list, however, there will always be a case that does 
not agree entirely with its terms. The First Amendment ensures that we have a right to free 
speech, but it does not address that there may be conditions concerning where, when, or how we 
may speak. It does not address the possibility of symbolic speech or of speech as conduct. Issues 
arise that transcend the text - that occur solely from the change of the times and the 
corresponding changes in national values and cultural mores. Others, still, existed from the 
beginning, but perhaps were taken as given, and those in whom are vested the responsibilities of 
codification simply feel it unnecessary to make them textually explicit. This oversight, or 
possible lack of foresight, depending upon your perception of the situation, causes problems for 
those whose job it is to interpret what they have penned. We have seen this problem arise in the 
last century alone in the issues of desegregation, free speech, elections, private property, and 
most notably for this dialogue, the right to privacy. 
DEFERENCE TO A HIGHER AUTHORITY 
Given the discussion in the previous section, we have little or no reason not to believe 
that the Constitution, though devoid of any explicit textual reference to a right to privacy, is not 
inclusive of such a right. If we concede that the Supreme Court is vested with the power to fully 
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and actively interpret the law - and in many cases this means invoking the power of judicial 
review - and if we recognize that judicial activism is an acceptable route for the Supreme Court 
to take, then we are left without good reason to deny that the Court may, with reason and 
apprehension, read into the Constitution those rights that are not explicit, but necessary for the 
faithful order and execution ofliberty. The Court may, from time to time, use the text of the 
Constitution to confer rights to the people that are not actually there. This sounds a bit 
improvisational for a government that purports to be democratic and liberal - a sort of fly-by-
the-seat-of-our-pants rule of law - but it is not as though the Court is simply making up the rules 
as it goes. In every instance where they have relied on a right to privacy as a defense for their 
decision, they have cited both constitutional provisions and/or common law precedent to justify 
their reliance on this constitutional right. 
Given the venerable history and tradition of the highest bench, we may justly view them 
as legitimate and trustworthy guardians ofthe law. Though we may defer to their authority in 
deciding what is there and what is not, it is worth examining their methods and justifications to 
determine which cultural values and which lines of the Constitution point to a right to privacy. 
THE RIGHT TO BE LET ALONE 
What is so special about privacy? Privacy, it has been said, is a notion at least as old as 
common law itself.62 It precedes the drafting of our Constitution, the formation of the United 
States, and even the dawn of Western civilization as a whole. The concept itself, beyond the 
bounds of the law, has important historical, philosophical, anthropological, and sociological 
62 Brandeis and Warren. 
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significance.63 Aristotle made the distinction between public and private spheres of life, the latter 
being the realm of the home and the family and separate from that of the government. Nineteenth 
century utilitarian philosopher John Stuart Mill, in his essay On Liberty, noted that the public 
sphere is that which refers to the appropriate realm of government action, and that there existed a 
private world in which the government had no place. Likewise, eighteenth century political 
philosopher John Locke, in his Second Treatise on Government, argued that there existed a state 
of nature wherein every person had an equal claim to all property - which was all public in its 
essence. Locke noted, however, that we own ourselves and our bodies, which are therefore 
private. He also declared that a person may come to own private property by "mixing one's labor 
with it. ,,64 If a person were to till a piece of land, for example, he or she could come to own it 
privately. Sociological anthropologist Margaret Mead said that various cultures - other than 
modem Westerners - seek privacy by having certain rituals and ceremonies away from the group 
in secret locations. They also seek to keep certain members of the group away from these 
practices, so as to have them in private. Also, zoological anthropologist Alan Westin asserted 
that animals also look for privacy away from their larger family groups. They go to private 
locations to bear their children, to mate, and to die.65 We can see, then, that privacy is not a 
modem innovation, but is perhaps something that is intrinsically valuable and natural, not only 
because we are human, but simply by virtue of being alive. 
The concept of privacy is not without its criticisms, however. The first and foremost of 
these is the basic question of whether there is actually anything special about privacy, in and of 
itself. Many contemporary critics argue that every action said to be protected by a fundamental 
63 Judith DeCew, "Privacy," The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, (14 May 2002), 




right to privacy is likewise protected by other rights and liberties, most notably by the rights of 
private property explicit in the Fifth Amendment and by basic bodily security. This reductionist 
criticism of privacy, however, cannot be misconstrued in its rhetoric and apparent truth to 
encompass all rights under the umbrella of privacy. In Lawrence v. Texas (2003), the Supreme 
Court ruled that persons have a right, under privacy, to engage in homosexual relations.66 I fail to 
see how this right falls under either the rights of private property or bodily security. A right to 
homosexual relations is a right to choose one's lifestyle, and it falls under neither camp, no 
matter how broadly we stretch them. We can therefore reject reductionist criticisms of privacy, 
and move on to others with more substantial merit. 
The second most powerful criticism is the one put forth by feminists. They claim that if 
the "private domain [is] free from any scrutiny" then it becomes dangerous to women and 
minorities because it allows the perpetuation of discrimination behind closed doors. If the 
government is prohibited from entering the sacred walls of the home, it must tum a blind eye to 
the crimes - both of physical abuse and repression - committed within them.67 Though feminists 
like Catharine MacKinnon make valid points about crimes committed behind closed doors, their 
belief that privacy itself would be the cause for perpetuation is ludicrous. A right to privacy does 
not preclude prosecution. The institution of marriage is sacrosanct and protected by the right to 
privacy, but it is not immune from the greater state interest of prosecuting domestic violence. 
Criminal behavior dissolves the sacredness of the boundaries of privacy, unless the behavior in 
question, such as that in Lawrence, can be shown to have its own substantial worth. 
Less pertinent to our argument, but still mildly substantial is Richard Posner's economic 
criticism of privacy. His claims are less applicable here simply because his arguments concern 
66 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), at 558. 
67 DeCew 
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infonnational privacy - the differences between this and the matters actually at hand will be 
explained later. Regardless, we may still utilize his thesis in the respect of keeping our private 
actions private from active communication in the public sphere. Posner claims that privacy is 
only valuable insofar as the infonnation we want to protect is valuable. The less valuable the 
infonnation, the less we rely on a right to privacy. This is the reason, he argues, that professors 
do not let their students read their letters of recommendation; it undennines the value of the 
statement if the author is afraid of offending the student being recommended.68 I find this thesis 
accurate in its observation, but lacking in its authority as a successful criticism of the value of 
privacy. Privacy assures us that infonnation disclosed is protected. It allows us to be more 
forthcoming to medical professionals, to our attorneys, to our religious leaders, and our spouses. 
Truth is protected and secured when privacy is guaranteed. Ifwe were to remove the protection 
of infonnational privacy from the doctor-patient relationship, then we might feel less confident 
about releasing embarrassing infonnation about ourselves to a professional who might better 
help us were he or she privy to this knowledge. Even worse, removing this confidence could 
allow those with alternative or unpopular lifestyles to become targets of crime or discrimination. 
Privacy itself makes these relationships fruitful, and so Posner's claim that there is nothing 
special about it falls far short of accuracy. 
Other criticisms of privacy rights include the non-constitutionality of the phrase and the 
fact that reading it into the law, as the Supreme Court appears to have done, amounts to judicial 
activism. I believe that previous statements are enough to rule out these final critiques, 
considering that we have already accepted that judicial activism is not a detriment to the power 




Though the major criticisms have been overcome, we still have the lingering question: 
What is so special about privacy? Privacy is special for no other reason than that it is part of our 
"inviolate personality" as human beings.69 Though Westin concluded that animals also have an 
innate notion of privacy, this only shows that privacy transcends the manmade world, and is 
something of which we have a natural concept. We speak of privacy hereafter, however, as a 
feature of humanity and basic human dignity.7o It is a necessary condition for the human race to 
lead valuable lives, to have intimate relationships, and to feel that we possess something special 
which no one and no government can take from us. What is special about privacy is its moral 
significance. Privacy ensures autonomy and dignity, and "has moral value because it shields us 
in all ... contexts by providing certain freedom and independence - freedom from scrutiny, 
prejudice, pressure to conform, exploitation, and the judgment of others.'.7l Privacy gives us 
status as moral actors and "protects us from unwanted access by others.'.72 
Moreover, some degree of privacy is necessary for the people to trust their government. 
How free would any of us feel if our homes, our bodies, or our lives were subject to random 
government inspection or control?73 The very concept is overtly Orwellian, but simply imagine 
what our natural reaction would be if our government suddenly adopted such a position on 
privacy. We would lose all faith in the stewardship of our leaders, and we would make a 
conscious effort to hide the pieces of our lives to which we did not want others to have access. If 
nothing else, this example illustrates that we value our privacy as having some intrinsic worth, 




73 "The Fundamentals of Our Fundamental Freedoms," CCLA, <http://www.ccla.org/schools/personal.shtm1> 
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namely, that it allows us to live freely without fear of intrusion - to own all the dignity afforded 
us as human beings. 
Two interpretations. It is generally accepted that Louis D. Brandeis and Samuel D. 
Warren made the first mention of any "right to be let alone" in American legalese. Their 
pUblication in the Harvard Law Review, aptly titled The Right to Privacy, identified that not only 
was privacy instrumental in the function of government and daily life, but that it was also the 
responsibility of the law to adapt itself to make room for it. Arguably the first patrons of serious 
judicial activism, Brandeis and Warren asserted that "political, social, and economic changes 
entail the recognition of new rights, and the common law, in its eternal youth, grows to meet the 
new demands of society.,,74 Reliant on history, custom, and their beliefs about what the Founding 
Fathers intended in the ratification of the Bill of Rights, The Right to Privacy points to a 
fundamental right to be let alone, textually explicit or not. 
It is worth noting, however - not to contradict my argument, but in the end to strengthen 
it - that the type of privacy Brandeis and Warren were so adamant about protecting is not the 
type of privacy on which the remainder of this thesis will focus. Brandeis and Warren's concept 
of privacy is the traditional notion - what I will call hereafter the "Fourth Amendment 
interpretation of privacy." The type of privacy with which my argument is concerned is the less 
tangible version - the privacy of person. I will explain each in tum. 
The Fourth Amendment states that "the right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated 
... ,,75 This may be slightly confusing, since I have identified the second type of privacy as 
privacy of person and yet the word "person" is mentioned in the Fourth Amendment. To clarify, 
74 Brandeis and Warren 
75 United States Constitution, Amendment IV 
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"person" in the Fourth Amendment sense refers to the physical person. In other words, our 
physical bodies are free from unwarranted search and seizure, whereas the second type of 
privacy will focus more on the intangible aspects of personhood. 
In the physical sense, the right of privacy is limited to those who are in a place that a 
person would reasonably expect to be private, such as a home, a phone booth, a hotel room, a 
car, etc. 76 There is a general acceptance that we have a right to privacy vis-a-vis home invasion, 
security of documents, and intrusion on the physical body, but there is debate concerning the 
breadth of the Fourth Amendment's protection. Over time, the amendment has grown to include 
the privacy of personal information, and this intensifies the competition between the individual 
and the government's "need to know."n 
Technology was technically the first real threat to any right to privacy. Until telephones, 
wiretaps, computers, surveillance cameras, cell phones, PDAs, and global satellite positioning, 
just to name a few, became the norm, there was little fear that a person's privacy could be 
invaded. People were secure in their homes, save only from the occasional peeping tom.78 
Nevertheless, the individual and the state have been able to strike a compromise when it comes 
to a right to privacy concerning both information and physical boundaries. The use of search 
warrants allows persons a reasonable degree of privacy while allowing the government access to 
information it finds pertinent, so long as the state (as officers of the law or government officials) 
can convey to a judge a relevant and convincing belief - called "probable cause" or "reasonable 
grounds" - that the information it seeks is in a particular private location. Warrants must also be 
76 Katz v. u.s., 389 U.S. 347 (1967), at 350. 
77 "The Fundamentals of Our Fundamental Freedoms." 
78 Ronald B. Standler, "Privacy Law in the USA," (24 May 1998), <http;llwww.rbs2.comiprivacy.htm>. (Accessed 
24 October 2005). 
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tailored so that they narrowly define the items, evidence, or information sought; they may not be 
used as licenses to "go fishing," so to speak.79 
Controversial though it may remain, it appears as though the Fourth Amendment right to 
privacy has all but been declared universally accepted. It is also often taken for granted that "the 
Supreme Court has been explicit in ruling that privacy is a central reason for Fourth Amendment 
protection ... ", even though the word is not so much as mentioned in the text of the amendment. 
The problem and the crux ofthe controversy over a right to privacy, we see, occurs when, as 
Brandeis and Warren said, the necessity arises "to define anew the exact nature and extent of 
such protection.,,8o Their words laid the ground for a more contemporary version of a right to 
privacy, and the one on which the remainder of this argument will address. 
The notion of a broader interpretation of privacy - the privacy of person - puts the entire 
issue of privacy in a very different context, one in which "the government attempts to limit the 
choices of individuals in various personal areas, such as use of contraception or abortion, whom 
to marry, and the right to choose how to rear and educate one's children.,,81 What we mean here 
is something decidedly more intimate than any conception of physical security as privacy. This is 
a personal privacy which comprises the privacy of decision, choice, preference, lifestyle, and 
self. Personal privacy seeks to protect both the tangible body and the less solid idea of the 
choices that affect it. "It has generally been viewed as a right protecting one's individual interest 
in independence in making certain important and personal decisions about one's family, life, and 
lifestyle.82 When we broaden the concept of privacy to include more than the physical self or 
surrounding, then we allow such issues as abortion, contraception, sodomy, death, education, 
79 "The Fundamentals of Our Fundamental Freedoms." 




religion, marriage, medical treatment, and physician-assisted suicide to fall under the umbrella of 
a right to privacy. 
This is the controversy with privacy. No one argues that we have a right to feel secure in 
our homes, or that our conversations are private unless they become the subject of some 
compelling government interest such as national security or criminal prosecution, but if we 
affirm a fundamental right to privacy, we let in all ofthe above controversial topics, 
guaranteeing ourselves fundamental rights to abortion, procreation, prevention of procreation, 
marriage, homosexuality, death, and so on. We tiptoe on dangerous ground in declaring that a 
fundamental right to privacy exists, as many a conservative dissent will show in the discussion of 
case law, but can we use a slippery slope argument to deny the people what Brandeis and Warren 
called one of the rights "most valued among civilized men,,?83 I, like the Supreme Court, have 
reservations with doing this. The right to privacy has been declared a fundamental right over and 
over again in the text of common law, thus elevating it to the level of free speech and freedom of 
the press. The great risk posed in doing this was, is, and will remain the same: There is no right 
to privacy in the Constitution. Unfortunately, no amount of rhetoric can change that - only a 
constitutional amendment can make it textually explicit, and given the bevy of controversial 
topics which would become irrefutable if such an amendment were added, we can say with 
certainty that we will not have to worry about it at any time in the near future. 
The task before me, however, is to show that a right to privacy actually exists, and to do 
that, I will have to show that even though the right to privacy is not textually explicit in the 
Constitution, the language of the document, coupled with history, custom, tradition, and original 
intent, is sufficient to make the right implicit enough to call it explicit. We have already 
established that a loose interpretation of the Constitution is not only acceptable, but required to 
83 Brandeis and Warren 
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keep the Constitution in tune with the times, so there is no harm in looking into the text to see if 
it permits a right to privacy. To do this, I turn to common law and the opinions ofthe venerable 
justices appointed to Supreme Court. Based on their opinions and judgments of the law, we will 
see that there is enough evidence in the document that a right to privacy ought to be considered 
one of our fundamental freedoms. 
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PERCEIVING PRIVACY 
"Had those who drew and ratified the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment or the 
Fourteenth Amendment known the components of liberty in its manifold possibilities, they might 
have been more specific. " - Supreme Court Justice Anthony Kennedy 
Though we well established in the last section that there is no explicit right to privacy 
within the body of the Constitution, we may interpret the document broadly enough so as to 
encompass such a right. In no way will we be simply creating this right from the mere desire for 
it, as many interpretivist critics would argue, but rather, we look to the insinuations of other 
rights and the suggestions of several amendments for our foundation. The Supreme Court has 
relied on such nuances for more than forty years to ground and verify the right to privacy. We 
look now to their decisions in several major privacy cases and the grounds they rely on to justify 
their "creation" of a right to privacy. 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO PRIVACY 
As early as 1923, the Supreme Court began using a privacy-type defense in its decisions. 
Though a right to privacy was never specifically invoked, cases like Meyer v. Nebraska (1923) 
and Pierce v. Society of Sisters (1925), both of which concerned parents' rights to raise and 
educate their children and were decided based on the notion of liberty in the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment, laid the foundation for a right to privacy inherent in the same 
c1ause.84 In his dissent in the 1928 case of Olmstead v. Us., Justice Louis D. Brandeis first 
articulated the now famous phrase "the right to be let alone," derived from his joint publication 
with Samuel D. Warren.85 In 1944, the Supreme Court used the Fourteenth Amendment to issue 
84 "Exploring Constitutional Conflicts: The Right of Privacy," 
<http://www.1aw.umkc.edU/faculty/projects/ftrials/conlaw/rightofprivacy.htm1> (Accessed 4 January 2006). 
85 Olmstead v. u.s., 277 U.S. 438 (1928), at 478. 
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fundamental status to the right to procreate in Skinner v. Oklahoma.86 These cases all referred to 
topics later deemed and understood as private, though they were cited so at the time. The major 
advancement, however, was still several decades in the making. 
In 1965, everything known about privacy law in the United States changed. The Supreme 
Court handed down its decision in the landmark case of Griswold v. Connecticut. Estelle 
Griswold, executive director of the Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut, and the league's 
medical director, a Yale-educated, licensed physician, were both convicted under a Connecticut 
statute criminalizing the dissemination of both information regarding contraception and 
contraceptive devices themselves. The Connecticut statute made it a crime for any person to use 
a "drug or article" to prevent conception, and the doctors had given information to a married 
woman and prescribed her a contraceptive device for personal use.87 The particular section of the 
law in question also declared that "any person who assists, abets, counsels, causes, hires, or 
commands another to commit any offense may be prosecuted and punished as ifhe were the 
principal offender.,,88 Justice William O. Douglas delivered the opinion of the Court in the [vote] 
decision which affirmed the right to privacy for the first time. In asserting that access to and 
distribution of contraception to married persons was a matter of privacy, Douglas declared that 
though there was no right to privacy explicit in the text of the Constitution, there was evidence of 
such a right in the "penumbras" and "emanations" of several constitutional amendments.89 The 
Court has recognized, Douglas said, that the First Amendment includes at least one peripheral 
right, and also several insinuations within it that allude to a right to privacy.90 There is no right of 
association mentioned in the First Amendment, Douglas correctly declared, but he points out that 
86 Skinner v. State of Oklahoma. Ex. Rei. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942), at 541. 
87 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), at 479. 
88 Ibid, at 480. 
89 Ibid, 482-484. 
90 Ibid, at 482 
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the Supreme Court recognized a fundamental right to privacy in one's associations based on the 
First Amendment in the case of NAACP v. Alabama.91 The First Amendment reads: "Congress 
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably 
to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.,,92 Though it makes no 
textual reference to a right to associate as one chooses, it is interpreted, through the religion 
clauses and the right to assemble, that the First Amendment contains a penumbral right of 
privacy in the right of association.93 Douglas goes on to articulate the "various guarantees 
[within the Constitution that] create zones ofprivacy.,,94 In addition to the First Amendment, 
there is also the Third Amendment's proscription that "no soldier shall ... be quartered in any 
house, without the consent of the owner ... ,,95 The Fourth Amendment guarantees the "right of 
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable 
searches and seizures.,,96 The Fifth Amendment's self-incrimination clause protects the privacy 
of the self.97 Finally, Douglas declares that the Ninth Amendment's allowance for the retention 
of un enumerated rights likewise alludes to a right to privacy.98 Based on so many textual 
references, or insinuations, of a right to privacy, the Court held that such a right to privacy must 
be broad enough to encompass the "sacred precincts of marital bedrooms" and the right of 
married persons to prevent conception.99 
91 NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958), at 462. 
92 United States Constitution, Amendment I 
93 Griswold v. Connecticut, at 482-483 
94 Ibid, at 484 
95 Ibid, at 484, and United States Constitution, Amendment III 
96 Ibid, at 484, and United States Constitution, Amendment IV 
97 Ibid, at 484, and United States Constitution, Amendment V 
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99 Ibid, at 485 
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Justice Arthur Goldberg's concurring opinion relies primarily on the unenumerated rights 
clause in the Ninth Amendment, which reads: "The enumeration in the Constitution of certain 
rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people."IOO The very 
language of the Ninth Amendment points to the idea that a right to privacy may be interpreted as 
part of the document, if societal evidence exists to show the people believe they should have 
such a right. "The language and history of the Ninth Amendment reveal that the Framers ofthe 
Constitution believed that there are additional fundamental rights ... which exist alongside those 
fundamental rights specifically mentioned in the first eight constitutional amendments."IOI The 
entire purpose of including such an amendment, Goldberg declares, was to quiet fears about 
adopting a document that contained an explicit list ofthe people's rights. Including the Ninth 
Amendment gave the government a way to proverbially cover all of its bases in case they forgot 
something. 102 Goldberg goes on to point out that in the I Annals of Congress 439, James 
Madison specifically stated this purpose to Congress amid arguments that granting certain rights 
to the people would disparage others not mentioned. Madison conceded that this was the best 
argument against the ratification of the Bill of Rights, but that the Ninth Amendment would 
serve as an adequate safeguard because it would allow for the later inclusion of rights not 
specifically guaranteed at that particular time. 103 In no way could the Framers have intended the 
first eight amendments to the Constitution to be an exhaustive list of all of the rights retained by 
the people. To do so would have been not only to commit an injustice against the people they 
were claiming to serve, but also to err in their judgment ofthe people's values. The Ninth 
Amendment does nothing to "broaden the powers of the Court," but it lends support to the Due 
100 United States Constitution, Amendment IX 
101 Griswold v. Connecticut, at 488 
102 Ibid, at 489 
103 Ibid, at 489-490 
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Process Clauses' conceptions of liberty inherent in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments by not 
limiting their incorporation to the literal text ofthe first eight amendments. 104 "To hold that a 
right so basic and fundamental and so deep-rooted in our society as the right of privacy ... may 
be infringed because that right is not guaranteed in so many words by the first eight amendments 
to the Constitution is to ignore the Ninth Amendment and to give it no effect whatsoever.,,105 
Justice John Marshall Harlan II's concurring opinion relied on the concept of substantive 
due process for its justification of contraception as an aspect of privacy. Such aspects, he argued, 
are "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty," a phrase first uttered in the case of Palko v. 
Connecticut. 106 Rights deemed fundamental must meet with the standards and norms of society 
and the deep traditions of history in the United States, and these rights must be dictated by the 
bounds of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Byron White also 
concurred on the grounds ofliberty under the Fourteenth Amendment, which states that "no state 
shall ... deprive any person oflife, liberty, or property without due process oflaw. 107 Substantive 
due process involves claims which arise under the liberty aspect of the Due Process Clause, and 
in this case, Justices Harlan and White claim that privacy is in accordance with concept of liberty 
as it arises here. IDS 
In conclusion from Griswold, we see that "taken together, those amendments indicate a 
fundamental concern with the sanctity of the home and the right ofthe individual to be [let] 
alone.,,109 Moreover, it is clear that "the Bill of Rights ... reflects the concern of James Madison 
and other Framers for protecting specific aspects of privacy ... ,,110 
104 Ibid, at 493. 
105 Ibid at 491 
106 Ibid: at 499, and Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937), at 325. 
107 Ibid, at 502, and United States Constitution, Amendment XIV 
108 O'Brien 15-16 
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Griswold's companion case, Eisenstadt v. Baird, addressed the same right to 
contraception as it applies to single persons. In Eisenstadt, the conviction involved the 
dissemination of contraceptives to an unwed woman after a lecture describing their use. The 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court set aside the conviction for exhibiting the contraceptives, 
but upheld the conviction for distribution. III As written, the law in question in this case allowed 
for the distribution of contraception to married persons, however, only for the prevention of 
disease, not the prevention of conception. Singles were not allowed to obtain contraceptive 
devices and only doctors or pharmacists were allowed to prescribe such devices. I 12 Eisenstadt 
was decided on the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause, as well as on the tenets of 
Griswold. The idea is that the need for contraception is equal between married and single 
persons, and once you allow it for one, as in Griswold, you must allow it for both.ll3 In citing 
Griswold, the case also affirms the principles of the penumbras and emanations apparent in the 
first eight amendments, the enumeration clause of the Ninth Amendment, and the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The major significance of Eisenstadt, however, is that it 
affirms that privacy is not simply an aspect of the sanctified union of marriage, but an aspect of 
citizenship. Justice William Brennan asserts in his majority 6-3 opinion: 
It is true that in Griswold the right of privacy in question inhered in 
the marital relationship. Yet the marital couple is not an individual 
entity with a mind and heart of its own, but an association of two 
individuals each with a separate intellectual and emotional 
makeup. If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the 
individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted 
governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a 
person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child. I 14 
111 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), at 440 
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The 1967 case of Loving v. Virginia, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of marriage 
as it relates to privacy. Having previously decided that there is something sacrosanct about the 
marital bedroom in Griswold, the Court was now faced with deciding that marriage itself, and 
not just its bedroom activities, was fundamental to the notion of privacy. 
Mildred Jeter, a black woman, and Richard Loving, a white man, married in 
Washington, D.C., and returned to Virginia in June of 1958. In October of 1958, the couple was 
indicted under a Virginia antimiscegenation law. The Lovings pleaded guilty in January of 1959, 
and they were sentenced to one year in jail for their crime. The trial judge agreed to suspend their 
sentence for twenty-five years pursuant on the condition that the couple leave the state and not 
return for those twenty-five years. The Lovings agreed and moved to the District of Columbia. In 
1963, they filed a motion to have the judgment vacated on the grounds that it violated both the 
Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses ofthe Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court of 
Appeals of Virginia upheld the constitutionality of Virginia's antimiscegenation law, arguing 
that the state's legitimate purpose in restricting who could marry whom was to preserve racial 
integrity and that there was no violation of the Equal Protection Clause insofar as the Fourteenth 
Amendment is construed to mean that equality can be applied separately to the races, so long as 
it is applied equally. I IS 
The Supreme Court, however, disagreed, arguing that the only justification for the law 
was purely based on race, and was therefore a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal 
Protection Clause. I 16 The Court also said that such a law also deprives the Lovings of their 
liberty under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. "The Fourteenth 
Amendment requires that the freedom of choice to marry not be restricted .... The freedom to 
115 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), at 2-3, 7-8 
116 Ibid, at 11 
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marry, or not marry ... cannot be infringed by the state.,,117 Though the reference to the Due 
Process Clause and Chief Justice Earl Warren's insistence that the state may not intervene in a 
couple's decision to marry - or a single person's decision not to - do not specifically mention 
a right to privacy, Loving has been cited multiple times as the case that affirms marriage is 
included in those actions under privacy's umbrella. 
In the 1969 case of Stanley v. Georgia, a unanimous Court also extended the right to 
privacy to cover the possession and viewing of obscene materials in the home. Under the 
guidance of the First and Fourth Amendments, Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote in his majority 
opinion that "whatever may be the justifications for other statutes regulating obscenity, we do 
not think they reach into the privacy of one's own home."IIS This portion ofthe defense rested 
obviously on the Fourth Amendment protection of houses and effects against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, but the real crux of the defense in Stanley came from Marshall's next few 
lines, dictating that a more personal form of privacy was at issue in this case. Marshall declared 
that "if the First Amendment means anything, it means that a State has no business telling a man, 
sitting alone in his own house, what books he may read, or what films he may watch. Our whole 
constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of the giving government the power to control men's 
minds.,,119 The Court, more adamantly than in Griswold, thus affirmed that the First Amendment 
contains an implicit right to privacy in its periphery. Not only, they insisted, does the home 
constitute a "zone of privacy," but so, too, do the minds of men. 
The Court further expanded the notion of a First Amendment right to privacy when it 
once again tackled the right of parents to rear their children according to their own choice. The 
117 Ibid at 12 
118 Sta~ley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969), at 565. 
119 Ibid, at 565 
Court had already decided in Meyer that parents have a right to teach their children a foreign 
language under the liberty principle in the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause: 
Without doubt, [the Due Process Clause] denotes not merely 
freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to 
contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to 
acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up 
children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own 
conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized 
at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by 
free men. 120 
In like fashion, the Court agreed in Pierce that parents have a right to send their children to 
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private schools if they choose to do so. The state of Oregon had passed a Compulsory Education 
Act in 1922 requiring that all students attend public school. 121 Relying heavily on its two-year-
prior opinion in Meyer, the Court declared that the Due Process Clause also covers the right of 
parents to choose the path of the children's education. "The fundamental theory of liberty upon 
which all governments in this Union repose excludes any general power of the state to 
standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only.,,122 As 
the law stood, it unreasonably interfered ''with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the 
upbringing and education of children under their control.,,123 These two cases, though making no 
mention of privacy as the foundation for their justification, laid the groundwork for the 1972 
case of Wisconsin v. Yoder, which translated the liberty principle of the Due Process Clause as 
inclusive of a private right to choose one's religion and education according to religion under the 
conditions of the First Amendment. 
In 1972, several members of the Amish population of Green County, Wisconsin, were 
convicted for violating the state's compulsory education policies by pulling their children out of 
120 Meyer v. State a/Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), at 399. 
121 Pierce v. Society a/the Sisters a/the Holy Names 0/ Jesus and Mary, 268 U.S. 510, (1925), at 530. 
122 Ibid at 535 
123 Ibid: at 534-535 
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public schooling after the eighth grade. The law required that all children remain in the school 
system - public or private - until age 16. The Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld the conviction 
on appeal, but in a 6-3 decision, the Supreme Court reversed, declaring that it is within the First 
and Fourth Amendments' tenets for parents to decide how far their children can be educated 
according to their religious beliefs. 124 The Amish did not object to early elementary education 
because children needed to learn the basics of reading, writing, and arithmetic to read the Bible 
and participate actively in a normal Amish life. 125 They objected, however, on the grounds that: 
Formal high school education beyond the eighth grade is contrary 
to Amish beliefs, not only because it places Amish children in an 
environment hostile to Amish beliefs with increasing emphasis on 
competition in class work and sports and with pressure to conform 
to the styles, manners, and ways of the peer group, but also 
because it takes them away from their community, physically and 
emotionally, during the crucial and formative adolescent period of 
life. 126 
The Amish argued that requiring their children to attend school when it was detrimental to the 
very way of life they held dear was both a violation of the First Amendment right to the free 
exercise of their religion and their Fourteenth Amendment right to raise their children according 
to their own values. 127 The Court agreed with their sentiments, and Chief Justice Warren Burger 
attempted to quiet fears that allowing Amish families to dictate the terms of their children's 
education would lead to a slippery slope allowing all sorts of fanatical or fundamentalist groups 
to propagate dangerous views to their children. "A way oflife that is odd or even erratic," he 
wrote, "but interferes with no rights or interests of others is not to be condemned because it is 
different.,,128 
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The state still has an interest in the education of its children as far as interference with the 
rights of or harm to others is concerned, but it cannot act in an all-encompassing parens patriae 
role. To allow this would be to allow the government to have control over our most intimate 
choices. 129 Like Meyer and Pierce before it, Wisconsin v. Yoder, makes no explicit mention of 
the word privacy, but it does emphasize a reliance on religion and the level of intimacy involved 
in such a choice or association. The Court already declared in NAACP v. Alabama that a person 
has a right to associational privacy, but Yoder goes much deeper than that. Choosing one's 
religion and choosing to live according to its precepts is one of the most intimate decisions a 
person can make in his or her lifetime. The fact that it is not mentioned explicitly as private does 
not make it any less so. By declaring that the state may not interfere in one's choice of religion 
or - with reasonable expectation - one's free exercise thereof, the Court has, in essence, 
declared that choice itself is a zone of privacy. Some decisions are so intimate, so entangled with 
the very nature of what it means to be a person, that they are free from all government intrusion. 
The state may not - I dare say, cannot - enter my mind and tell me how to think. The conduct 
by which we act may be regulated, but my decisions, my choices, and my thoughts are my own, 
and therefore private. They fall under the realm of privacy precisely because they are outside the 
realm of government interference. 
At the beginning of the 1970s, however, the face of privacy rights in the United States 
underwent their most dramatic and controversial change to date. "No longer was the Court 
legislating at the margins against curious, outdated, and nationally unpopular state laws" like 
those in Griswold and in Loving, but now was tackling greater and highly divisive "in bold and 
broad strokes.,,130 The case was, of course, the landmark 1973 case of Roe v. Wade, and the 
129 Ibid, at 234 
130 Goldstein, p.l00 
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aftershock of the decision still tears through political debate thirty-three years later. Arguably, 
Roe is one of the most controversial cases the Court has ever decided, and more readily 
defensible, it is the most contentious privacy case to which the Court has ever granted cert. In 
1972, a pregnant single woman, known in the case under the pseudonym Jane Roe - ironically, 
to protect her privacy - brought suit against the state of Texas, challenging the constitutionality 
of Texas' criminal abortion laws. The laws in question, Texas Penal Code articles 1191-1194 
and 1196, outlawed abortion in all situations except one exceptional circumstance. 131 These 
statutes "make it a crime to 'procure an abortion,' as therein defined, or to attempt one, except 
with respect to 'an abortion procured or attempted by medical advice for the purpose of saving 
the life of the mother. ",132 Roe claimed that the Texas statutes were unconstitutionally vague and 
that they abridged her "right of personal privacy" apparent and protected by at least the "First, 
Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments.,,133 The District Court sided with Roe, 
declaring that it is a fundamental right for all women - both married and single - to choose 
whether to bear children under the Ninth Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment's liberty 
principle in the Due Process Clause. The statutes in question were unconstitutionally vague 
concerning what would or would not constitute a jeopardy to the mother's life, and were 
overbroad in their infringement upon Roe's right to liberty.134 
Justice Harry Blackmun wrote the majority opinion in the 7-2 case, but before going into 
the defense for the Court's decision, he elected to filter through the common moral objections to 
abortion - the personhood debate, maintaining the dignity ofthe physician, the state's interest 
i3l Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), at 113, 118. 
132 Ibid at 118-119 
133 Ibid: at 120 
134 Ibid, at 122 
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in protecting life, and the idea oflife beginning with conception. 135 Discounting the moral 
objections would allow the legal reasoning to shine through and be, ideally, free of personal 
opinion on the ethical permissibility of the practice. The Court is not in place to legislate taste, 
nor to shed light on ethical dilemmas that have endured since the dawn of man; the justices are 
arbiters oflaw, and their only objective is to consider the constitutionality of the practice, not its 
moral popUlarity. Typical conservative appeals to history and the Hippocratic Oath are null, 
Blackmun declares, simply there is no compelling evidence of an historical condemnation of 
abortion. Criminal abortion laws, he points out, are of relatively recent vintage, most only being 
established during the latter half of the nineteenth century, so any claim that abortion has been 
proscribed by our norms and values for centuries is merely arguing for effect and not from 
fact. 136 The truth is actually quite to the contrary. Ancient views on abortion were much more 
lenient. The Greeks and Romans, in fact, practiced abortion regularly, and "it was resorted to 
without scruple."m In The Republic, Plato describes that children born deformed or from 
unapproved childbirth shall be either aborted or vacated from the ideal city. Indeed, there was 
little protection shown to the unborn in ancient times. 138 Granted, it is difficult to argue the 
ancient perspective in modem times, but it is worth noting that abortion has not always been a 
condemned practice. Also, the Hippocratic Oath is an oddity, Blackmun argues, because ancient 
beliefs on abortion do not mesh with the text of the Oath. While translation from dead languages 
is never completely accurate, the Oath is generally thought to read: "I will neither give a deadly 
drug to anybody if asked for it, nor will I make a suggestion to this effect. Similarly, I will not 
135 Ibid, at 129-151 
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give to a woman an abortive remedy."J39 Though Hippocrates' words appear rather clear, it is 
difficult to reconcile his statements with the thoughts of his contemporaries. Language is 
suspect, and debate still rages over whether Hippocrates' words actually insinuated suicide and 
abortion, since the Greeks and Romans both were advocates of- or at least, tolerant of-
abortion, infanticide, and suicide. 14o 
Blackmun also addresses the arguments concerning fetal viability and personhood, 
arguing that medically speaking, the fetus is not "quickened" - the first recognizable 
movements of the fetus in utero - until around the sixteenth week of pregnancy. Common law, 
he notes, has not traditionally indicted women or physicians for performing abortions before the 
quickening of the fetus. 141 Though the fetus is biologically alive at this stage of development, it 
is not capable of surviving without attachment to the mother's body, and until it has developed 
such capacity, many, including Blackmun, argue that we cannot view the fetus as a person. 142 
Perceptions vary as to when "personhood" begins. Some in the fundamentalist theological sect 
argue that life begins at conception and abortion is therefore murder. One popular view that 
persisted until the nineteenth century was that sustaining "animation" - infusion with a soul -
took forty days for a male and eighty days for a female. 143 Despite all popular view, however, the 
Court has declared that there is no qualification in the Constitution for what the term "person" -
primarily used in the Fourteenth Amendment- actually means. "No case could be cited that 
holds that a fetus is a person within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.,,144 Moreover, 
139 Ibid, at 131 
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Blackmun said, the Court will not construe the term to include the unborn, so personhood 
arguments as an attack on abortion are roads to nowhere. 145 
After appropriating the focus to the legal arena by showing that moral claims do not hold 
weight in the justiciability of the case, Blackmun turns to the defense of the decision. The Court 
recognizes openly in Roe that "the Constitution does not explicitly mention any right to privacy," 
but holds that it "has recognized that a right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas 
or zones of privacy, does exist under the Constitution.,,146 The opinion relies heavily on 
precedent from Stanley, Katz, Brandeis' dissent in Olmstead, Griswold, Meyer, and Pierce to 
illustrate the multiple times a privacy defense has been called upon by the Court. Blackmun 
affirms that the "only personal rights that can be deemed 'fundamental' or 'implicit in the 
concept of ordered liberty' are included in this guarantee of personal privacy," and he delivers no 
short list of the various aspects that the Court has designated as fundamental. 147 A brief sample 
includes rights relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, and child-
rearing and education. 148 It is not random chance that these topics all concern personal choices, 
and it is no mere coincidence that they have all relied on substantive due process to support 
themselves as being included in a fundamental right to privacy. 
Relying on this very concept of liberty inherent in the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, the majority of seven declared that "this right of privacy ... is broad 
gh , d .. h h . h ,,149 enou to encompass a woman s eClSlon w et er or not to termmate er pregnancy. 
Nevertheless, the Court does not issue a free-for-all with respect to our bodies, but recognizes 
that the state does have a compelling interest in protecting life, and the right to an abortion must 
145 Ibid, at 157-158 
146 Ibid at 152 
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balance against this state interest. The state may impose narrowly drawn and specific limitations 
on abortion, but may not draw such regulations so as to burden the mother or abridge her right to 
choose. They may, for example, designate that abortions performed in the third trimester may be 
done so only to save the life ofthe mother, but they may not proscribe the practice. 150 
William Rehnquist's powerful dissent relies heavily on the arguments countered by 
Blackmun in the majority opinion. The conservative appeal to history, morality, and prevalence 
of law, however, do not stand against the overwhelming authority of constitutional claim. 
Rehnquist declares that thirty-six states - at the time of Fourteenth Amendment's adoption in 
1868 - had criminal abortion laws on their books.151 The question is, however, since when is 
popularity tantamount to constitutionality? The prevalence of a law makes it no more 
constitutional than the degree of faith in an opinion makes it indisputably true. The one does not 
imply the other, and some better defense for the proscription of abortion is necessary. 
Rehnquist attempts such a constitutional proscription with the typical conservative 
defense that a right to privacy is not explicit in the text of the Constitution. "To reach its result," 
he claims, "the Court has had to find within the scope ofthe Fourteenth Amendment a right that 
was apparently completely unknown to the drafters of the amendment.,,152 But regardless of its 
non-appearance in the body of the Constitution, the Court has on numerous occasions confirmed 
its existence, and what is more, Rehnquist himself qualifies what a right to privacy under the 
Fourteenth Amendment truly entails in his majority opinion in Washington v. Glucksberg in 
1997. Though his opinion and defense may have held some weight in 1973, the curiosities in the 
evolution of the right to privacy and the ideology of the Court point to an ever-increasing 
acceptance - even among conservatives - that the right is there somehow. 
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Though Roe is likely as controversial as the right to privacy gets, the next two decades 
saw debacles of their own. In 1986, the Court heard arguments in the case of Bowers v. 
Hardwick, which attempted to put sodomy on the list of activities protected by a right to privacy. 
The Court, however, was unwilling to do so because, as they noted, the activities under a right to 
privacy have been registered as "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" or "deeply rooted in 
this nation's history and tradition.,,153 The Court decided that homosexual activity is neither of 
these. The Court, we see, is fickle in its application of the principles and dogma of history in 
deciding its cases, but this is largely attributable to those cases penned by conservative majorities 
since the creation of a privacy right out of the constitutional cloth was primarily a liberal 
endeavor. Nevertheless, inconsistency undermines legitimacy, and the Court looks foolish in its 
opinion in this case. Byron White, in writing for the bare 5-4 majority, uses the spotlight to 
chastise the Court itself for its precarious insistence on privacy rights. "The Court is most 
vulnerable and comes nearest to illegitimacy when it deals with judge-made constitutional law 
having little or no cognizable roots in the language or design of the Constitution.,,154 He cites 
that twenty-five states have anti-sodomy laws on their books - a statement which makes the 
opinion look all the more untrustworthy, considering that Footnote six in the opinion lists thirty-
eight, the most recent of which passed in 1868.155 Once again, we must question why popularity 
is believed to amount to constitutionality, and we are left to believe that the non-explicit defense 
is simply the conservatives' way of jUdging taste and personal morality. It is difficult to believe 
that abortion is morally permissible under the tenets of substantive due process, but sodomy is 
not. As Justice John Paul Stevens says in his dissent, "the fact that the governing majority in a 
state has traditionally viewed a practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law 
153 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), at 191-192 
154 Ibid at 194-195 
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prohibiting the practice.,,156 There is no compelling interest, he argues, for denying fundamental 
status to such an intimate choice as to engage in the sexual activity of one's choosing. 
Justice Blackmun's fiery dissent emphasized that "this case is about 'the most 
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men,' namely, 'the right to be let 
alone. ",157 Blackmun points out that the Court, in its majority, relies on the idea of homosexual 
sodomy, but that in fact, the actual law makes no mention ofthe sexes of those involved in the 
act, and attributes the opinion to the Court's "almost obsessive focus on homosexual activity.,,158 
Not only does the claim involve "an unconstitutional intrusion into [Michael Hardwick's] 
privacy and his right to intimate association," but the activity occurred in the home, which 
already has Fourth Amendment privacy significance. 159 "The right of individuals to conduct 
intimate relationships in the intimacy of his or her home seems ... to be at the very heart of the 
Constitution's protection ofprivacy.,,16o 
Blackmun's powerful dissent in Bowers became the foundation for the Court's 2003 
opinion in Lawrence v. Texas, where the right to engage in homosexual sodomy was affirmed in 
a 6-3 vote. The Court failed in Bowers, wrote Justice Anthony Kennedy, to recognize the liberty 
at stake in the case. 161 The Court emphasized the precedent of Griswold's marital bedroom and 
Eisenstadt's privacy of the individual, and concluded, in standard fashion, that denying persons 
the right to choose their sexual partners and sexual activity is a violation of the liberty principle 
in the Due Process Clause ofthe Fourteenth Amendment, and runs counter to the very heart of 
the right to privacy therein. 162 
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The most recent of the activities discussed as part of a right to privacy came under fire in 
1997 in the case of Washington v. Glucksberg. The case considers the right to die via physician-
assisted suicide, and begins with an examination of the nation's history and opinion on the 
matter, affirming that it is a crime to assist suicide in almost every state. 163 The unanimous Court 
held that the Due Process Clause does not restrict liberty by denying the right to assisted suicide 
simply because it guarantees fairness in allowing the refusal and/or removal of life-sustaining 
medical treatment. 164 The right to refuse medical treatment was affirmed as a "constitutionally 
protected liberty interest" in the case of Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health in 
1990, when an invalid girl's parents requested to remove their daughter from life support after 
clear and convincing evidence was presented that those were her wishes.165 In a concurring 
opinion in Cruzan, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor confirmed that privacy was an essential 
element in this right, declaring that "the liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause must 
protect, ifit protects anything, an individual's deeply personal decision to reject medical 
treatment." 166 
In Glucksberg, however, Rehnquist, as Chief Justice, emphasized the tenets of the 
Hippocratic Oath and declared a veritable condemnation on suicide, which, as we saw earlier, 
has not always been regarded as a reprehensible practice. It is, in fact, of a somewhat recent 
vintage and is often regarded simply as immoral, rather than indefensible. Nevertheless, the 
Court refuses to grant physician-assisted suicide and the right to die as fundamental privacy 
rights because, as Rehnquist declares: 
[There] has always been a process whereby the outlines of the 
liberty specially protected by the Fourteenth Amendment - never 
163 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997), at 710 
164 Ibid at719 
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fully clarified, to be sure, and perhaps not capable of being fully 
clarified - have at least been carefully refined by concrete 
examples involving fundamental rights found to be deeply rooted 
in our legal tradition.167 
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The state's interest, the Court said, involves protecting the vulnerable from being taken 
advantage of, as well as protecting the disabled and terminally ill from prejudice. 168 Justice 
O'Connor, in her concurring opinion, declared that we could not always secure that a decision to 
terminate one's own life would be voluntary. There could pressure from family members to end 
the economic burden of long-term care, for example, and until we can guarantee that such an 
intimate decision would actually be one's own, the state must be allowed to intervene. 169 Justice 
Stevens adds that allowing a fundamental right to die by physician-assisted suicide opens up the 
possibility that doctors could kill patients who had become unruly or unmanageable and simply 
label murder as "mercy.,,170 In sum, the Court declares that the state interest is too overwhelming 
in this case to declare a fundamental liberty interest in physician-assisted suicide, refusing to 
grant it privacy status. 
On January 17, 2006, however, the Court handed down its ruling in the much-anticipated 
case of Gonzales v. Oregon, which dealt with Oregon's 1994 Death with Dignity Act, allowing 
the terminally ill to seek physician assistance in ending their own lives. The Oregon act was the 
first state law in the history of the United States "authoring physicians to prescribe lethal doses 
of controlled substances to terminally ill patients.,,171 The law requires counseling and 
mandatory waiting periods in order to actually receive the drugs. The 6-3 majority opinion 
written by Justice Kennedy never mentioned the word privacy, but rather questioned whether 
167 Washington v. Glucksberg, at 722 
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physician-assisted suicide ran counter to the Controlled Substances Act of 1970. The act was 
intended to prevent physicians from dealing illicit drugs, not to define standards of general 
medical practice according to state law. The Court, however, danced around the issue of granting 
privacy status to the right to die by declaring that former Attorney General John Ashcroft - who 
originally brought the case to court - had acted illegally in threatening to revoke Oregon 
physicians' licenses for prescribing lethal drugs to terminally ill patients. l72 Privacy issues were 
not raised in this case, but its inclusion in this discussion is appropriate because of the nature of 
the activity in question. The Court may not have addressed privacy here, but there is little doubt 




"There is a constitutional right to privacy composed of at least two distinguishable parts. One is 
the privacy expressed most vividly in the Fourth Amendment: The government shall not break 
into my home or my office without a warrant, based on probable cause; the government shall 
leave me alone. The other is the notion of personal autonomy. The government shall not make 
my decisions for me. I shall make, as an individual, uncontrolled by government, basic decisions 
that affect my life's course. " 
- Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg 
Unfortunately, there is no such thing as an explicit constitutional right to privacy. Such a 
right, however, requires no line of text if we view the Constitution as a living document, open to 
interpretation, change, and modernization. The document, as it was ratified in 1789, does not 
mean the same thing now as it did then. Hosts of amendments have changed the nuance of the 
American legal tradition, and a long line of Supreme Court cases point us to the belief that there 
may be something there which is textually not. 
Many of the basic rights we value are not present in explicit detail within the body of the 
Constitution. There is no constitutionally protected right to travel, to vote, to a jury of our peers, 
to marriage, to receive an education, to bear children, or to prevent conception. 173 As citizens, 
however, we perceive these rights to be ours, and the Court has, on more than one occasion, 
confirmed that convention goes a long way in determining and interpreting the rights of the 
people. 
We have no choice but to open the Constitution to a loose interpretation and to allow 
judges to create rights out of the fabric that weaves our body of law. If we are to stay with the 
times, with changing norms, with the greater respect for both autonomy and tolerance, then we 
are left no other option. We cannot look to the Constitution as a document grounded in stone. If 
it were meant to be stolid and steadfast and inflexible, it would have been written that way. It is, 
however, rife with ambiguities and inconsistencies, and we leave it in the hands of those so 
173 Mount 
highly educated in constitutional law - those arbiters of that law - to determine what it does 
and should mean. 
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We may argue intent of the Framers all we like, but at the end of it all, we will never 
know exactly what meaning they entrusted in the text of the Constitution. We have only our 
knowledge of the present and the hope for the future to guide us in our constitutional venture. It 
is impossible to rationally argue that the Framers preconceived every possible conflict that could 
arise under the document, and it is likewise impossible to believe that they could have had the 
foresight to enumerate every last possible right the people could or should retain. It is in our 
worst interest to appeal to the state of things more than two hundred years ago. Life is not the 
same, the world is not the same, and "we, the people" are not the same. We labor in futility by 
defending the position that they knew best. 
In judging our own values, a right to privacy has come to the forefront of the 
constitutional debate only recently. The concept of privacy, however, is a notion older than the 
discovery of America. It is not a right that needs a line of text to support its importance, its 
validity, or its necessity. Privacy is a basic human right, and has even been codified into 
international law. The United Nations' Universal Declaration of Human Rights reads: "No one 
shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home, or correspondence, 
not to attacks upon his honor and reputation.,,174 How is it that the international community can 
recognize so fundamental and so basic a right, but one ofthe United Nations' founding members 
- and one to sign this very charter - cannot perceive of it in its own body of law? 
The paradox is absurd, but the fact remains that the Supreme Court has taken it upon 
itself to advocate this right, explicit or not. We can point to six amendments that allude to a right 
174 United Nations' Universal Declaration of Hurnan Rights, Article 12. 
to privacy, and we can read countless opinions in which the Court has defended this right over 
and over again based on these penumbras and peripheries alone. 
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Those in denial of such a right's constitutional existence would do well to consider one 
thing: What would you appeal to ifthe government suddenly took any form ofthe right to 
privacy away? There is no legal doctrine, no document, nothing to use to defend the right, save 
the long line of common law entirely reliant on the insinuations of six amendments. I guarantee 
that the threat of removal would be sufficient to convince the most rigid of interpretivists that 
something in the Constitution points to a fundamental right to privacy, whether it be the 
emanations from the Bill of Rights, the unenumerated rights clause in the Ninth Amendment, or 
the liberty principle in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The basic idea is that some decisions are so intimate and so personal that the government 
has no business interfering with them. Life is the most precious of all of our assets, and we retain 
the right to choose for ourselves what we will make of it and what it will mean to us. The denial 
of privacy rights at best stands against, and at worst ignores, all of American history, world 
history, and basic human dignity. 
The insinuation of support for these claims in the law is undeniable: Whether we like it or 
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